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I. INTRODUCTION
Early in American jurisprudence, Chief Justice John Marshall described
a corporation as follows:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as
are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.'
Modem corporate law allows the object of a corporation's creation to be
any lawful purpose.' However, such lawful purpose must be for profit since,
by definition, a business corporation is "for profit."'
In microeconomics and finance it is a tenet of the theory of the firm that
firms are wealth maximizers.4 The basic finance theory that managers should
* Associate Dean for Administration and Research, Michigan State University; B.A.,
University of Texas, 1967; M.A., University of Texas, 1968; J.D. University of Texas, 1972;
LL.M., University of Texas, 1977; Ph.D., Michigan State University, 1993.
1. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
2. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (1984).
3. Id. § 1.40(4).
4. THOMAS E. COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY
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maximize the value of the corporation by investing in all positive net present
value projects serves the dual purpose of maximizing the value of the
corporation and the wealth of the shareholders. However, managers may not
take advantage of all positive net present value opportunities. Several explana-
tions, such as price depression of equity issues5 and agency costs,6 have been
offered for this phenomenon. In their 1984 article7 Corporate Financing and
Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not
Have, Stewart C. Meyers and Nicholas S. Majluf created a model revealing
that under certain conditions corporations may forego positive net present
value projects, thereby failing to maximize the value of the corporation, if
such projects require the corporation to issue new shares to finance them.8
Myers and Majluf assume asymmetric information-that firm managers have
inside information that investors do not have. Further, they assume that
managers act in the best interest of old, passive shareholders, who do not
rebalance their portfolios in response to the firm's actions. 9
The central paradigm of corporate finance is that corporate managers
maximize profits, which maximize the value of the corporation, which in turn
maximizes shareholder wealth.'0 Recent developments in the law, however,
are eroding this paradigm. The trend toward corporate social responsibility,
changes in the object'of the fiduciary obligations and the business judgment
rule by the courts, and corporate constituency statutes that allow corporate
managers to consider the interests of other stakeholders such as creditors,
employees, and the community undermine the profit and value maximization
assumptions of traditional corporate financial theory.
The law and corporate financial theory are diverging. Since corporations
are jural persons and exist only in contemplation of the law, managers are
constrained by the law. This Article examines the assumption that managers
act in the best interest of old shareholders in making corporate investment
18 (3d ed. 1988); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23 (3d ed. 1992).
5. See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 61 (1986); Richard Kolodny & Diane R. Suhler, Changes in Capital Structure, New
Equity Issues, and Scale Effects, 8 J. FIN. RES. 127 (1985); Ronald W. Masulis & Ashok N.
Korwar, Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 91 (1986);
Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the
Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1986).
6. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
7. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 188-89.
10. See, e.g., COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 4, at 18, 401, 553, 667, 743; Ronald W.
Masulis, The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices, 8 J. FIN. ECoN. 139, 140
(1980); cf. Myers & Majluf, supra note 7, at 191.
[Vol. 46:449
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decisions. The validity of this assumption is tested by an analysis of certain
aspects of corporation law and its developments. Additionally, an analysis is
made of the fiduciary duties owed under state corporation acts and court
decisions, the business judgment rule, corporate social responsibility, and state
corporate constituency statutes.
II. FINANCE AND THE LAW
This Part explores the divergence of corporate law and corporate financial
theory beginning with the Berle and Dodd debate" and traces the develop-
ment of the corporate constituency statutes and other legal constraints that
restrict managers' decision-making processes.
A. Separation of Ownership and Control
Many of the problems encountered in corporate financial theory and
corporate law are rooted in the separation of ownership and control.12
Control has passed from ownership hands into the hands of management;
management personnel is more highly specialized and selected for
professional competence; its motivations are substantially different from
those of the owner-capitalist; and its area of discretionary action and the
character of the limitations that bound their area differ markedly from
those relevant to the enterprises of an earlier capitalism.
13
The nonprofit maximization theory in economic literature is largely associated
with corporations in which ownership is separated from control.4 Corpora-
tions are owned by shareholders who do not run them and run by managers
who do not own them. 5 The depersonalization of the shareholders' relation
to the corporation was explained by Berle and Means in the following terms:
11. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
12. Berle and Means traced the evolution of modem corporate structure as it shifted from
shareholder to management control. ADOLF A. AUGUSTUS BERLE, JR. & GARDNER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-40 (3d ed. 1968). In this article
"control" means managerial authority and not the absence of a controlling shareholder or block
of shareholders.
13. Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of "Managerialism, " 31 J. Bus. 1, 1 (1958).
14. See F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
32-33 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the separation of ownership and control and its effects).
15. Ownership of a small percentage of a corporation's stock by managers does not undercut
the analysis because managers still control property they do not own: the percentage of the
corporation owned by shareholders other than management.
19951
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The spiritual values that formerly went with ownership have been
separated from it. Physical property capable of being shaped by its owner
could bring to him direct satisfaction apart from the income it yielded in
more concrete form. It represented an extension of his own personality.
With the corporate revolution, this quality has been lost ... 16
Shareholders no longer are owners in the traditional sense, but only are
investors in corporate equity securities.1" This limits the shareholder-
investor's interest in the enterprise to capital appreciation and income. 8
Whether a separation of ownership and control has occurred as maintained
by Berle and Means and others is open to debate. The typical individual
shareholder is simply an investor desirous of income and capital appreciation.
Moreover, there is no separation of ownership and control in the vast majority
of corporations that are family owned or closely held. The question of
separation of ownership and control only arises regarding the relatively few,
large public corporations. When interlocking directorates, acquisitions,
institutional investors, and family blocks-including foundations-are
considered, a relatively small group of individuals or institutions hold a
controlling interest.19 The real issue to be addressed is the level of activity
undertaken by these controlling shareholders: Are they active enough that
managers must accede to their wishes?
In their model Myers and Majluf assume that managers act in the best
interest of the old shareholders, although they admit that they have no theory
why.2" One explanation for this assumption is that corporations are not as
diversely held as hypothesized in managerialism theory. Old shareholders may
have power because there exists a small group of shareholders-individuals,
foundations, other corporations, or institutions-that hold a controlling interest
in virtually every major publicly held corporation in the United States today.
Institutional investors alone hold more than $6.5 trillion or approximately 53
percent of the country's equity.2 Currently great institutional investors
debate their proper role in corporate governance.?2
16. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 12, at 64-65.
17. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE
OF CORi'ORATE POWER 11 (S. Prakash Sethi & Dow Votaw eds., 1975).
18. See J.A.C. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 271 (1969).
19. See FERDINAND LUNDBERG, THE RICH AND THE SUPER-RICH 814-24 (Bantam Books
1969).
20. Meyers & Majluf, supra note 7 at 189.
21. Sherry R. Sontag, Investors Use Clout in the Corporate Government Battle, NATL. L.J.,
Dec. 2, 1991 at 23.
22. See James A. White, New York's Regan to Pensions: Hands Off, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
1991 at C1. Edward V. Regan, the New York State comptroller and sole trustee of New York's
public pension fund, is alarmed that pension funds, particularly the California Public Employees
[Vol. 46:449
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Controlling shareholders elect the board of directors. Often, the
controlling shareholders' representatives control the board. The controlling
shareholders also give managers a free hand to operate within certain limits,
one of which concerns the value of the controlling shareholders' stock.
This scenario would seem to support the Myers and Majluf assumption
that managers act in the interest of the old shareholders, if by old shareholders
they mean old controlling shareholders. It also raises the specter of minority
shareholder oppression, which is the subject of a great number of corporate
fiduciary and business judgment rule cases.' The following analysis takes
both theories of control into account.
B. The Parting of the Ways
In the first part of the twentieth century, corporate financial theory and
corporate law espoused a profit maximization paradigm. In microeconomics
the theory of the firm is that firms are profit maximizers.24 If competitive
firms did not maximize profits, they would be inefficient; therefore, they
would be forced out of business by the efficient firms.?5 Monopolists are
presumed to be profit maximizers by virtue of their position.' Moreover,
if the shareholders could directly run the corporation, they would opt for profit
maximization and its corresponding cost minimization. Corporate financial
theory further holds that maximizing profits maximizes firm value which in
turn maximizes shareholder wealth.27 The landmark case of Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. 8 was decided in 1919. In Dodge the court addressed whether a
corporation organized for profit could divert its profits from the shareholders
to society at-large. The court drew a distinction between "an incidental
humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of the employees"
and a general purpose plan to benefit humankind.29 The court unequivocally
stated:
Retirement System (CALPERS), may get involved in corporate governance issues that have
nothing to do with providing benefits to retirees. He advocates a passive investor role.
CALPERS and other institutional investors are advocating active participation in corporate
governance.
23. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
24. Varian, supra note 4, at 25.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 4, at 20, 401, 553, 667, 743.
28. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
29. Id. at 684.
1995]
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A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself,
to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
... [l]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to
shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental
benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting
others .... 30
As corporations grew in size and complexity, ownership was separated from
control, and the law evolved to reflect these changes in the structure of
twentieth century American society.
Because a corporation can act only through agents, it must necessarily
have the capacity to appoint them.3' The officers and employees are the
agents of the corporation 2 and owe their allegiance to the corporation, not
to the directors.33 However, corporate finance textbooks and articles
continue to assert erroneously that managers are the agents of shareholders.34
The board of directors situation is unique. Although shareholders elect
and may remove directors, the directors are not agents of the shareholders,
and the shareholders are not principals. Directors are not agents of the
corporation because of their statutory powers of management; they are not
subject to control by anyone, which is a requirement of the principal-agent
relationship.3" The law of agency deals with the relationship between
principal and agent, and because directors are neither principals nor agents,
new law had to be created or old law modified to deal with the relationship
between a director and the corporation.
1. The Fiduciary Relationship
Based on their analysis of a series of early corporation cases, Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means contend that
30. Id.
31. W. EDWARD SELL, AGENCY § 16 (1975).
32. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BuSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 219, 223-24 (3rd ed. 1983) (discussing officers as agents of
corporations).
33. See id. at §§ 219-227 (discussing the duties of officers as agents of the corporation).
34. See, e.g., COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 4, at 17; Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs
of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AEA Papers and Proceedings 323,
323 (May 1986); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 309.
35. See SELL, supra note 30, at § 24.
[Vol. 46:449
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all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation,
or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from statute or
charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the
ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.... Irihe
use of the power is subject to equitable limitation when the power has been
exercised to the detriment of their interest, however absolute the grant of
power may be in terms, and however correct the technical exercise of it
may have been.... And that, in every case, corporate action must be
twice tested: [F]irst, by the technical rules having to do with the existence
and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat
analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trust-
ee's exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making him
a fiduciary.36
Berle and Means believed that corporate law, in substance, was a branch of
the law of trusts.37 The fiduciary concept in corporate law can be traced to
the law of trusts.38 Acknowledging, however, that this position was more
theory than practice, Berle and Means stated: "In fact, if not in law, at the
moment we are thrown back on the obvious conclusion that a stockholder's
right lies in the expectation of fair dealing rather than in the ability to enforce
a series of supposed legal claims.""
The position advocated by Berle and Means was previously adopted in
Delaware when the Chancellor in Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp.'
recognized that while "not trustees in the strict sense of the term, yet for
convenience [directors] have often been described as such."41
In addition to the two traditional duties of care and loyalty from a
fiduciary relationship, Delaware courts impose a third duty of obedience,4'
a subdivision of the duty of loyalty from an analytic standpoint. Justice
Cardozo described the fiduciary duty in his now-famous quote: "Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior."' This is but the beginning of the problem, however, for as
Justice Frankfurter aptly said, "[t]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary?""
36. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 12, at 220.
37. Id. at 242.
38. Cf. AusTIN W. ScoT-r, THE LAW OF TRusTs §§ 170, 174 (4th ed. 1987) (discussing a
trustee's duty of loyalty and duty of care).
39. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 12, at 243.
40. 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff'd, 140 A. 264 (Del. 1927).
41. Id. at 466.
42. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985); Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
43. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
44. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
1995]
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This is the crux of the matter. To whom are corporate officers and directors
fiduciaries?
This question was the topic of the debate between Adolf Berle and E.
Merrick Dodd. Berle defended the traditional corporate financial theory that
corporate management exercises its powers solely for the benefit of the
shareholders. 45  Dodd argued for a broader exercise of corporate powers,
contending that management should exercise its powers on behalf of a broader
constituency. Moreover, Dodd argued that the corporate purpose extended
beyond making a profit for shareholders. 6 The debate ended in 1954 when
Berle capitulated by agreeing that the corporate trust extended to the entire
community and was not solely for the benefit of shareholders. 7 Although
the Berle-Dodd debate ended with Dodd's view prevailing, corporate financial
theory still embraces Berle, and there are lingering elements of the debate in
corporate law today.
Corporate statutes generally are consistent regarding to whom the
fiduciary duty is owed; however, a few corporate statutes extend the duty to
the corporation and the shareholders.48 The Model Business Corporation Act
imposes a fiduciary duty on officers and directors for the benefit of the
corporation by providing, "A director shall discharge his duties as a
director . . . in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation."49 The drafters of the Model Act and state legislatures have
taken the position that the duty is owed to the corporation and not to any
particular constituent stakeholder group.50
45. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049
(1931).
46. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932).
47. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
48. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300(a) (3) (Law. Co-op. 1990); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-8-30 commentary (1990) (recognizing that the drafters deleted the language from the
North Carolina Business Corporation Act that extended a fiduciary duty from directors to
shareholders).
49. REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORP. AcT § 8.30(a)(3) (1984); see also HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 232.
50. But see Childsv. RIC Group, 331 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (recognizing that
under Georgia law a director holds inside information in trust for the shareholders), aff'd per
curiam, 447 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1971); Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 492 P.2d 43, 45
(Idaho 1972) (construing the statutory fiduciary relation to the corporation to include sharehold-
ers); Dawson v. National Life Ins., Co., 157 N.W. 929, 937 (Iowa 1916) (concluding that a
fiduciary relation exists between a managing officer and a stockholder with respect to the
stockholder's shares); Sampson v. Hunt, 564 P.2d 489, 491 (Kan. 1977) (recognizing that under
Kansas law the director of corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the other stockholders), Jacquith
v. Mason, 156 N.W. 1041 (Neb. 1916). According to Henn and Alexander, these cases
demonstrate the minority rule that a duty is owed to shareholders in insider trading cases. See
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 239 n.7.
[Vol. 46:449
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The Berle-Dodd debate concerning whether the fiduciary duty runs to the
shareholders is continued through a line of cases that typically involve insider
trading and a purchase or sale of control. 51 Although couched in terms of
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders, these cases can be explained as
involving breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the corporation as a whole
where the phrase "corporation as a whole" encompasses all intracorporate
groups. Favoring one intracorporate group to the detriment of another is a
breach of duty owed to the corporation as a whole. 2 Moreover, many of
these cases involve discrimination among different groups of shareholders;
therefore, it is only logical that the courts should speak of duties owed to the
shareholders rather than the corporation. But even when courts extend the
fiduciary duty to the shareholders, they do not limit it to them. For example,
the directors of a financially troubled corporation owe a fiduciary duty to
creditors 3 even though no duty is owed to creditors of a financially healthy
corporation. 54
The formulation of the fiduciary concept by the Delaware Supreme Court
appears in Guth v. Loft, Inc.,' where the court stated that, although not
technically trustees, directors "stand in a fiduciary relationship with the
corporation and its stockholders."56 The court imposed a duty of "undivided
and unselfish loyalty to the corporation. "5  The subsequent discussion of
fiduciary duty refers to the corporation and does not further mention the
shareholders. Of course, the shareholders did not need mentioning because the
case involved an appropriation of a corporate opportunity. One may speculate
that shareholders were included because in 1939 the interests of the corpora-
tion and its owners were considered to be the same. Guth has been cited for
the fiduciary concept by the Delaware courts ever since.5
51. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985); see also
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 241.
52. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 240. There is a minority view that wealth
transfers from other stakeholders, such as bondholders, are permitted. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at
182-84.
53. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108-09 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1991).
54. See Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785,788-91 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del.
1988).
55. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
56. Id. at 510.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), modifiedon
reargument in part, 630 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988).
1995]
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The unresolved question was: What if there is a conflict between loyalty
to die corporation and to the shareholders? Can undivided loyalty to the
corporation be divided between the corporation and its shareholders if their
interests diverge? The Delaware Supreme Court answered that question fifty
years after Guth when it decided Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc. 9
Paramount is of particular importance in this analysis. Justice Horsey
distinguished the directors' duty regarding corporate value to the corporation
as an entity and their duty to the shareholders. His opinion suggests that the
fiduciary duty is owed to the corporate entity and not to the shareholders.'
Paramount distinguishes the stance taken by the Delaware Supreme Court
in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings," which expressly denied
that other constituencies were owed a fiduciary duty by management except
under certain conditions.62 Revlon involved a hostile takeover by Pantry
Pride. Revlon's board of directors engaged in defensive tactics to thwart that
hostile takeover.63 Moreover, the board acted to protect noteholders at the
expense of the shareholders. 4 The notes were issued as a defensive measure.
Hence, Revlon involves an intracorporate allocation of value. However, the
court did not prohibit the board from considering constituencies other than the
shareholders in stating that "while concern for various corporate constituencies
is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the
requirement that there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the
stockholders." 6 This concession by the Delaware Supreme Court is a step
toward liberalization of the fiduciary concept, although, the court cited Guth
v. Loft, Inc.' for the proposition that the fiduciary duty is owed "to the
corporation and its shareholders."'67
The concept of concern for other constituencies comes from Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.68 In Unocal Mesa argued that action by the Unocal
directors in opposing its two-tier tender offer for Unocal stock was a violation
of the fiduciary duty Unocal owed to its shareholders, including Mesa. The
Delaware Supreme Court said that the board of directors legitimately could be
concerned with "the impact [of the tender offer] on 'constituencies' other than
shareholders (i.e. creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
59. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
60. See id. at 1150.
61. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985); see Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150-51.
62. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
63. See id. at 175-79.
64. See id. at 182.
65. Id. at 176.
66. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
67. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179.
68. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
[Vol. 46:449
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community generally)."69 This language is similar to that of corporate
constituency statutes of other states.7"
Further, in Revlon the court declared that the initial duty of the board in
the face of the takeover was to preserve the corporation as an entity. At this
initial stage the board owed a duty to the corporate entity. After determining
that the corporate entity could not be preserved, the board's duty shifted to
maximizing the firm's value at a sale for the benefit of the shareholders.71
The shareholders take priority only after the board's obligations to a
corporation are fulfilled. Once a corporation goes on the auction block, the
board's duty is to maximize shareholder value; the board's objective no longer
is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise, but to sell it to the highest
bidder.'
Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.73 also involved a hostile
takeover. Relying on Revlon, the plaintiff shareholders argued "that Time's
board's decision to merge with Warner imposed a fiduciary duty to maximize
immediate share value and not erect unreasonable barriers to further bids."7'
In rejecting this argument the court noted "that Time's board, in negotiating
with Warner, [had not] made the dissolution or break-up of the corporate
entity inevitable, as was the case in Revlon."'" Therefore, the Revlon duty
to maximize the company's value at a sale for the benefit of the shareholders
was not triggered.76
The Court of Chancery in its opinion below posed the pivotal question,
also of importance in this Article: "Under what circumstances must a board
of directors abandon an in-place plan of corporate development in order to
provide its shareholders with the option to elect and realize an immediate
control premium?"' The Delaware Supreme Court responded by relying on
a provision of the Delaware Code that vests corporate control and management
in the board of directors78 and by distinguishing Revlon. First, the duty to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation imposed on directors under
Delaware law includes a "conferred authority to set a corporate course of
action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.""
Further, "the question of 'long-term' versus 'short-term' values is largely
69. Id. at 955.
70. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
71. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181-82.
72. Id. at 182.
73. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
74. Id. at 1149.
75. Id. at 1150.
76. Id. at 1151.
77. Id. at 1149.
78. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
79. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (emphasis added).
1995]
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irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a
corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment
horizon. "
80
Second, absent circumstances similar to those in Revlon, "a board of
directors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in
the short term, even in the context of a takeover." 8' In light of these
statements by the Delaware Supreme Court, managers who forego positive net
present value projects and, thereby, fail to maximize the value of the
corporation in the interests of the old shareholders violate their fiduciary duty
to the corporation and could be held accountable under Delaware law.
Although Time directly involved a takeover, the extension of the director's
fiduciary duties likely is not restricted to this context because of the broad
reach of the language quoted above. This case is extremely important because
of the status of Delaware corporate law in the field. The duty originally
imposed for the benefit of the shareholders has been transferred to the
corporation as a whole. If a fiduciary duty is owed to a corporation, a
fiduciary duty is owed to all stakeholders composing that corporation. The
shift from the shareholders to the corporation actually is a broadening of the
scope of fiduciary beneficiaries rather than a narrowing. The assumption that
managers act in the best interest of the old shareholders is losing its support
in the law; indeed, in Delaware, it may be gone. As demonstrated above, the
case law trend is toward finding a duty owed to the corporation as a whole.
2. Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a logical extension of the transference of
the object of the fiduciary relationship from the shareholders to the corporation
as a whole. Management is compelled to act in the best interests of the
corporation. The business judgment rule applies not only to directors, but also
to officers and controlling shareholders-collectively referred to as manage-
ment . 2
The Delaware Supreme Court states that the business judgment rule is "a
presumption that in niaking a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company. "83 The court mentions
only the company and not the shareholders in its formulation of the rule.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. (footnote omitted).
82. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 242.
83. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284
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Thus, in the Delaware courts the business judgment rule moved ahead of the
fiduciary concept.
Delaware adopted a more stringent business judgment rule for takeover
situations because of the "omnipresent specter" that the directors may be
acting in their own best interests rather than the best interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.' The Unocal court imposed an enhanced duty
calling for an initial judicial determination before conferring the benefits of the
business judgment rule.' In Delaware directors in a takeover situation must
show that they had reasonable grounds to believe "that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock owner-
ship."86 The directors may satisfy this enhanced duty by exercising good
faith and performing a reasonable investigation. 7 Approval of the board's
actions by a majority of independent, outside directors is strong evidence that
the duty was satisfied. 8
Care must be taken in discussing the business judgment rule. The rule
was created by courts for evidentiary purposes in cases involving alleged
misconduct by management8 9 The business judgment rule is a standard of
proof that creates a presumption that the board of directors acted in good faith
and exercised due care to further the best interests of the corporation. 90 The
purpose of the business judgment rule is to shield directors from liability in
shareholders' suits attacking discretionary business decisions made by the
directors. 91 Directors are protected even if the decisions turn out to be
wrong, provided they acted in good faith and exercised due care. 92 Courts
are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of boards of directors because
courts perceive the boards as possessing skills, information, and judgment not
possessed by the courts. 3
The business judgment rule protects only boards that act in good faith in
accord with their duty of loyalty,94 but only a duty of loyalty to the
84. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964)).
87. Id. (quoting Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555).
88. Id. (citing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.)), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981);Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805; Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
89. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 242. See generally Bayless Manning, The
Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHio ST. L.J. 615 (1984) (summarizing the business
judgment rule).
90. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
91. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 474 n.32 (D. Del. 1988) (recognizing that
the business judgment rule prevents courts from questioning decisions) (citing Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985)).
92. See Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554 (citing Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1960)).
93. Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608
(Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979).
94. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 242 (discussing the business judgment
1995]
13
Lashbrooke: The Divergence of Corporate Finance and Law In Corporate Governan
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:449
corporation, not to the shareholders. If the directors are disinterested, the
court likely will deem them to have acted in good faith.95 However, if the
directors are not disinterested and are beneficiaries of the action, they will
have breached their duty of loyalty, and the business judgment rule will not
protect them.9 6 If the plaintiff establishes that the board did not act in good
faith or breached its duty of due care, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant directors to show that the transaction was entirely or intrinsically
fair.
97
When it was developed, the business judgment rule represented a shift in
the judiciary's focus from shareholders to the corporate entity. 98 Fiduciary




The internal relationships between officers, shareholders, directors, and
the corporation are governed by the law of agency, the fiduciary concept
including the business judgment rule, and state corporation laws. Modem
courts are reconsidering the relationship between the corporation and society.
rule).
95. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United Copper See.
Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,263-64 (1917)); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731,
738-39 (Del. 1960); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971).
96. See Beard, 160 A.2d at 737 (discussing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660
(Del. 1952)); Puma, 283 A.2d at 695 (quoting David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249
A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968)) (finding the directors disinterested); see also, e.g., Clark v. Lomas
& NettletonFin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Galef,
615 F.2d at 57-58; Grynberg v. Farmer, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,683 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 1980) (concludingthat the directors on the Special Litigation Committee
were interested).
97. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Once a plaintiff
demonstrates that a director had an interest in the transaction at issue, the burden shifts to the
director to prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation.") (citing Geddes
v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 127
A.2d 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956)); see also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293
(3d Cir. 1980) ("At a minimum, the Delaware cases require that the plaintiff must show some
sort of bad faith on the part of the defendant."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Eldridge
v. Tymshare, Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[The] plaintiff... must be able
to make specific allegations of malfeasance or bad faith. Where an improper motive is claimed,
plaintiff must allege that it was the sole or primary reason for the directors' actions." (citing
Johnson, 629 F.2d at 287; Starbird v. Lane, 21 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1962))).
98. Cf. Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (concluding that under the
circumstances "the court should not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the duly
constituted [and disinterested] corporate management."); Walker v. Man, 253 N.Y.S. 458 (Sup.
Ct. 1931) (requiring interested directors to explain their conduct).
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The theory of corporate social responsibility is developing in the wake of
concerns about the environment, product safety, and social justice.
The traditional view of corporate social responsibility" provides that
corporations should make profits for their shareholders."°  Nonetheless,
constraints often have been placed on the means by which a corporation may
reach this goal. However, the profit motive remains the ultimate legal purpose
for which persons form corporations.
At common law, it is a tenet of sovereignty that when necessary for the
common good a government may regulate the manner in which citizens use
their private property. °1 ' As the Supreme Court stated:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at
large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his
grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he
must submit to the control. 12
More recent cases require corporate directors to consider more than the
interests of shareholders when making decisions. In 1953 the New Jersey
Supreme Court reached a watershed in the law of corporate social responsibili-
ty with its opinion in A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow.103 A.P.
Smith Manufacturing Company had contributed consistently to the local
community and occasionally to a local college and a local university. In 1951
the board of directors adopted a resolution to contribute to Princeton Universi-
99. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Gover-
nance-Two Models of the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1983); David L. Engel, An
Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Edwin M. Epstein,
Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and
Process, 30 HAsTINGs L.J. 1287 (1979); J.A.C. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory:
Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248 (1969);
R. Collin Mangrum, In Search of a Paradigm of Corporate Social Responsibility, 17 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 21 (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, Corporate Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal
and Economic Context of a Continuing Debate, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 114 (1984); Lewis D.
Solomon & Kathleen J. Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Social
Responsibility Debate, 12 J. CORP. L. 331 (1987) (discussing theoretical aspects of corporate
social responsibility).
100. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (1962) (discussing directors' responsibility to make profits
for their shareholders).
101. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876).
102. Id. at 126.
103. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
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ty. The company justified its action by claiming that the donations were a
sound investment and were made for a valid business purpose.'" t The court,
picking up the thread of the common law as articulated in Munn, carried the
proposition further, stating: "It seems to us that just as the conditions prevail-
ing when corporations were originally created required that they serve public
as well as private interests, modem conditions require that corporations
acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as
members of the communities within which they operate."'"°
Significantly, the court held not only that the gift had been made in the
reasonable belief that it would advance the interests of the corporation, but
also that the gift would benefit the public welfare and advance the interests of
the corporation as a part of the community in which .the gift operates.0 6
The court carefully added that the charity in question was not a pet charity of
the directors and that the gift was not made indiscriminately or in furtherance
of personal, rather than corporate, ends."t 7 Corporations were now autho-
rized to further social welfare.
More recent cases espouse a social responsibility theory for corpora-
tions.108 Nonetheless, social responsibility is constrained by reasonableness
because the profit motive remains the driving force behind corporate
existence. 109
State legislatures also are taking an active role in the expansion of the
scope of corporate fiduciary duties. Although Delaware has not, nearly one-
half of the states have enacted corporate constituency statutes." 0 These
104. See id. at 582-83.
105. Id. at 586.
106. Id. at 590.
107. Id. Apparently, the court would have reached a different result if the charity were a pet
charity of the directors.
108. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969)
("[U]nless corporations carry an increasing share of the burden of supporting charitable and
educational causes [then] the business advantages now reposed in corporations by law may well
prove to be unacceptable to the representatives of an aroused public.").
109. See id. at 405 (concluding that "the test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift
such as the one here in issue is that of reasonableness.").
110. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313
(West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202
(1994); HAV. REV. STAT. § 415-35 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 30-1702 (Supp. 1994); ILL. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 805, para. 5/8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Burns
1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210 (Michie Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:92 (West 1969 & Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347
(Vernon 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:6-1 (1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (Michie 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1994);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson 1992); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 516 (Supp.
1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992).
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statutes appear to be legislative reactions to the takeover mania of the 1980s
and the shift of holdings from the individual to institutional investors. A
typical provision permits the board of directors to examine a number of factors
when considering the best interests of the corporation."' These factors
include not only shareholders, but to the extent deemed appropriate,
employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, the community where the
corporation is located, short- and long-term interests of the corporation, and
all other pertinent factors."1 Moreover, no one group or interest need be
considered the dominant or controlling interest or factor."' Because most
of these corporate constituency statutes are permissive, not mandatory, they
vest great discretion in the board of directors. Five states restrict the
constituency statutes to takeover situations14 while the rest apply the statutes
to all decisions of the board of directors. Three states require directors to
consider other constituencies," 5 although the statutes apparently allow the
board to decide how the other constituencies should be taken into consider-
ation.
The corporate constituency statutes demonstrate that state legislatures
intend directors to consider other constituent stakeholders in addition to
shareholders when making decisions. Acting in the best interests of the
corporation means more than simply acting in the interest of the shareholders.
The interests of the corporation and its shareholders no longer are synony-
mous.
Business ethics scholars are pushing for an even broader extension of
corporate social responsibility. The extended stakeholder theory seems to be
dominant at the moment. Proponents urge adoption of this theory because it
can be accomplished within the framework of managerial capitalism. Under
this theory, ethically responsible management will consider other stakeholders
in addition to shareholders when making decisions. This Article already has
demonstrated that legislatures and courts impose this requirement. Business
ethics scholars differ in their approach because they advocate a circle of
stakeholders far broader than the corporation itself. For example, Professor
R. Edward Freeman defines a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives.""
6
111. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(1)(c) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
202(b)(5) (1994).
112. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
202(b)(5) (1994).
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
202(b)(5) (1994); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
114. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B.12-210(MichieSupp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West Supp. 1994); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988).
115. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1994).
116. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46
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This could include employees, customers, the community, governments, and
markets. Freeman's approach calls for an analysis of stakeholders' interests;
some are immediate and others are remote. The degree to which each
stakeholder group must or can be considered is not well-defined and appears
to be highly subjective and variable depending on the situation." 7
Professor Freeman also advocates a multifiduciary approach in which "the
manager must act in the interests of the stakeholders in the organization."" I8
This approach is particularly troublesome because the fiduciary relationship
traditionally has been reserved for trust or trust-like relationships. The duty
of undivided loyalty seems incompatible with a multifiduciary approach
because loyalties may change with the situation. The stakeholder theory
promoted by Kenneth E. Goodpaster retains the fiduciary relationship between
managers and shareholders, but advocates an ethical, nonfiduciary relationship
between managers and nonshareholder stakeholders." 9 Professor Goodpaster
does not understand that the fiduciary relationship is between the managers and
the corporation except in certain intracorporate disputes. 12 Thus, business
ethics scholars and others would move the law even further from traditional
financial theory and expand the spectrum of stakeholder constituency broader
than the courts or legislatures have to date.
III. RMEDIES
If management violates its fiduciary duty to the corporation in favor of the
shareholders, the law offers little in the way of meaningful remedies, The
shareholder derivative suit is a strictly legal remedy. Other potential remedies
are the proxy contest and the shareholder proposal, both of which are
regulated by federal and state securities laws.
A shareholder derivative suit is a claim asserted by a shareholder on
behalf of the corporation. In a shareholder derivative suit the law recognizes
that corporate directors may not be acting in the best interests of the
corporation when they refuse to assert the corporation's legal right to enforce
the directors' fiduciary duty to the corporation. The purpose of the suit is to
prevent abuse of authority by the board of directors. 2 '
Two obstacles exist to the use of the derivative suit as a remedy. First,
individuals allowed to bring the suit include shareholders who may have
benefitted from the directors' breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation.
(1984).
117. See id. at 54-64.
118. Id. at 249.
119. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and StakeholderAnalysis, 1 Bus. ETHics Q. 53,
61-73 (1990-91).
120. See discussion supra part II.B.1.
121. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 358.
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These shareholders are unlikely to bring a shareholder derivative suit that
might be detrimental to them. The second obstacle is the courts' application
of the business judgment rule to shareholder derivative suits. Under the
business judgment rule, courts seldom will interfere with intracorporate
decisions.'"
Before bringing a shareholder derivative suit, federal'2 and state124
procedural rules require the shareholder to demand formally that the board of
directors pursue the legal right of the corporation. Failure to make such
demand ordinarily results in dismissal. The demand requirement is excused
only if it would be futile. "  If demand is futile, the Delaware Supreme
Court applies a two-prong test to determine whether the suit will be dismissed
on motion of an independent committee of the board of directors. First, the
court must ask whether the committee acted independently and in good faith
after reasonable investigation. Second, the court must ask whether it would
come to the same conclusion applying the court's independent judgment. 126
The use of a shareholder derivative suit requires the participation of a
shareholder and an independent director concerned with acting in the best
interest of the corporation instead of the shareholders. The logical shareholder
candidate would be an outsider who, recognizing that the shares were
undervalued, would invest in order to bring the shareholder derivative suit.
This type of candidate likely would be interested in taking over the corpora-
tion.
The second group of potential remedies consists of the proxy contest and
the shareholder proposal. An insurgent shareholder may initiate a proxy
contest in order to make changes in corporate policy. If successful, the proxy
contest places the insurgent's nominees on the board of directors. Even if not
successful, however, the board of directors may make proposed policy changes
to ward off further attacks. A corporation is vulnerable to a proxy contest if
(1) management owns little or no common stock, (2) the corporation is
undervalued (asset value greater than market value of stock), (3) the
corporation has a poor performance record such as low earnings or low
dividends, or (4) the board of directors is not unified, providing potential allies
on the board to the insurgent shareholder.
122. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,263-64 (1917).
123. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
124. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
125. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-13 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Del. Ch.
1980)).
126. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89.
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Proxy contests are governed by regulations"' promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.128 Because proxy contests are expen-
sive,'29 the insurgent shareholder must ensure that the difference between the
market value of the stock and the asset value, including unfinanced positive net
present value projects, exceeds the costs of the proxy contest.
An alternative to a proxy contest is a shareholder proposal to invest in
positive net present value projects. Shareholder proposals are governed by
Rule 14a-8.111 Rule 14a-8 provides that if a shareholder entitled to vote at
a shareholder meeting wishes to make a proposal at the meeting, the
shareholder must notify management in advance. Management is required to
include the proposal in its proxy statement and form of proxy' unless it
demonstrates that the proposal is within one of the exclusions in the regula-
tions. 3 To be eligible to make a shareholder proposal the shareholder must
have held for one year at least one percent or one thousand dollars in market
value of the corporation's outstanding voting stock.'
A shareholder may solicit proxies as well as submit proposals. In 1987
the Securities and Exchange Commission eliminated a regulation that allowed
a corporation to omit shareholder proposals from proxy materials if the
proponent had delivered proxy materials to holders of more than twenty five
percent of a class of the corporation's securities.' 34 However, the corpora-
tion may omit the proposal if it concerns operations that account for less than
five percent of the corporation's total assets, net earnings, and gross sales and
if the subject of the proposal is not otherwise significantly related to the
corporation's business.
35
Shareholders must overcome two problems with a shareholder proposal.
First, shareholders are disadvantaged compared to management because
management has inside, nonpublic information concerning the true value of the
corporation. Second, shareholders must be willing to act contrary to their own
short-term best interests. Similar to the proxy contest and shareholder
derivative suit, the shareholder proposal remedy requires an outsider with
inside information.
Acting in the best interests of the shareholders instead of the corporation
is not a high-risk violation of the law. While the law explicitly requires
managers to act in the best interests of the corporation, the law does not
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1994).
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
129. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at § 196.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1994).
131. Id. § 240.14a-8(a).
132. Id. § 240.14a-8(c).
133. Id. § 240.14a(8)(a)(1).
134. Exchange Act Release No. 25,217, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,977 (December 29, 1987).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1994).
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provide an adequate remedy for breach of that fiduciary duty. The sharehold-
er derivative suit, proxy contest, and shareholder proposal are not effective
because they require actions by the very persons who may be the beneficiaries
of the breach of fiduciary duty. Such legal remedies rely on outsiders with
information concerning the updated values of foregone projects. To maximize
the value of the corporation, these outsiders must be willing to invest in the
corporation and endure expensive legal contests. If managers fail to maximize
the value of the corporation by acting in the best interests of the old sharehold-
ers, the law of corporate governance does not provide an effective solution to
the problem.
Effective remedies must be sought in the marketplace. Corporate
managers who do not maximize the value of their corporation may become
takeover targets. New management presumably will maximize the value of the
firm to glean a return on its investment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether one takes the separation of ownership and control or the
controlling shareholder view, the assumption that managers act in the best
interests of the old shareholders is no longer supported by the law. The
fiduciary concept has evolved in favor of the corporation as a whole and not
any particular stakeholder group. The business judgment rule consistently has
required a fiduciary duty to the corporation. However, recent developments
in corporate social responsibility and corporate constituency statutes have
broadened the number of stakeholders who may or must be considered; a
narrow focus on the shareholders has not been maintained. Case law
development is particularly important because case law develops in response
to legislative action. Courts have upheld the acts of managers who have
considered constituencies other than shareholders when making decisions.
If the law is a reflection of managerial action, it has changed dramatically
since the days of the Berle-Dodd debate. Corporate financial theory has
lagged behind these legal developments. Accordingly, the law and managerial
action now may be at odds. Through ignorance of the law or in deliberate
disregard of the law, managers act in the best interests of the shareholders to
the detriment of the corporation. Unfortunately, remedies must be sought in
the marketplace because the law provides little effective relief.
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